Palisades Fire After Action Report Describes Chaos

 

The 70-page After-Action Fire Report by the Los Angeles City Fire Department was released yesterday, October 8, after a suspect had been named in the Lachman Fire. The cause of  the Palisades Fire six days later was blamed on the Lachman Fire not being properly put out.

The After Action Report describes a chaotic mess, including not having someone in charge overseeing operations, to inadequate communication, to firefighters standing around because they were not assigned, to moving the incident command post three times (from Station 23, to Gladstones to Will Rogers), to failed evacuations, to failure to use pumps to utilize swimming pool water to more training needed for firefighters in Wildland-Urban Interface fires.

The report notes that the Incident Management Team (IMT) should be selected by recruiting qualified individuals based on their experience, education, and training. It appears that was not done in advance of the Palisades Fire.

Regarding evacuations, “Considering the location of neighborhoods within the Pacific Palisades region, it was evident that there was only one means of egress. It is imperative that the department immediately conduct an assessment of the neighborhoods’ necessity to establish two evacuation routes for all Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zones (VHFHSZ).” (That statement shows a lack of knowledge about Pacific Palisades. In some areas there is only one way in and one way out. Most streets feed into Sunset Boulevard.)

Highlands’ residents were concerned when L.A. City approved a senior center at 17310 Vereda de la Montura in a Very High Fire Severity Zone, because of evacuations. Their concerns were brushed away by the city.

At 10 p.m. on January 7, firefighters initially looked at that location to shelter in place 24 staff members, and 40 patients (14 of whom were non-ambulatory). It was decided that conditions were so severe, an evacuation was needed and was done successfully. By dawn multiple structures around the facility had burned to the ground.

At the beginning of the report, hurricane-force winds were mentioned as a factor for the fire’s intensity. There were no hurricane winds at the start of the fire. Palisades resident Michael Kureth examined 48 regional weather stations to find wind speed.  https://www.circlingthenews.com/early-palisades-…-hurricane-force/

“The LAFD After Action Report makes me mad that our LAFD leadership or their consultants/lawyers could be so cold and apathetic releasing a fake repot that leaves out so many facts and exaggerates others like hurricane level winds,” said Reza Akef of Polaris Homes. “I was in the Palisades Via Bluffs till 6:30 p.m. and the winds maybe were 35 mph.”

At the end of the October 8 Report it is noted, “Although significant wind was present from the onset and persisted throughout the incident, initial wind speed readings at the time of the alarm indicated opportunities for a considerable request for aircraft from neighboring agencies, contract aircraft, and state and federal aircraft during the initial attack.”

Starting on p. 18, the report breaks down the first critical hour and a half. A call from a resident to Station 23 around 10:30 a.m. stated “the Lachman Fire started up again.” (Editor’s note: it took nine months for ATF investigators to find out what residents were saying, that the Palisades Fire started because the Lachman Fire had not been fully extinguished. In the press conference naming a suspect in the Lachman Fire, reporters were told that firefighters do fire suppression.)

FIRST PROBLEM: LACK OF DEPLOYABLE SOURCES

The Metropolitan Fire Communications (MFC) Division Section filled out the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) Wildland Fire Mobilization Score Sheet to identify resources eligible for reimbursement related to pre-positioning for January 7, 2025. However, an inaccuracy in the fuel moisture percentage and the relative humidity on the (Cal OES) worksheet resulted in only one-third of the deployable and reimbursable resources being utilized. None of the City units deployed were in Pacific Palisades, although one was near Station 19 (Brentwood).

SECOND PROBLEM: LAFD STAFFING SHORTAGE

On January 7, 2025, there were vacancies throughout LAFD. As a result, voluntary scheduled overtime was to be used to obtain firefighters. There were a total of 225 members would have been required to either voluntarily staff or be recalled. In the past, on a Red Flag day, firefighters would have been recalled.  However, due to a change in the fire weather matrix in 2017, the decision to staff these available resources was changed from a category of “shall staff” to “consider staffing” due to financial constraints and departmental staffing shortages.

THIRD PROBLEM: LACK OF EQUIPMENT

On January 7, 2025, LAFD Supply and Maintenance Division (S&M) reported a total of 40 engines were currently in the S&M repair yard. These engines were unavailable due to mechanical issues.

THE PALISADES FIRE – FIRST 30 MINUTES

Starting on p. 17, the first 90 minutes of the fire is broken down click here.

Only seven fire companies were dispatched to the Palisades Highlands at the start of the fire, which is normal with a vegetation response. But a Red Flag day was different it should have triggered 27 fire companies and additional support personnel.

Just minutes into the response, while enroute, LF69 (Light Force 69) communicated to MFC  (Metropolitan Fire Communications) they had a significant loom-up, requested all water-dropping helicopters, ten additional engine companies, and reported a 30-40 mph wind.

Seconds later, BC9 (Battalion 9) confirmed the size-up with MFC and requested 20 additional engine companies. MFC confirmed with BC9 that the request was for a total of 20 engine companies, and BC9 confirmed. Heavy Equipment 1, Dozer 45 (DZ45), and Dozer 42 (DZ42) were also responding to the Sunset incident [Hollywood Fire] and were diverted by MFC to the Palisades incident.

All air support was working the Sunset Fire (in Hollywood), which had occurred at 10 a.m. (In total, 28 fire companies – compared to seven in the Palisades – all water-dropping helicopters, two dozer units, and multiple overhead command staff responded to Hollywood.)

One helicopter diverted enroute to Hollywood after seeing the smoke in Pacific Palisades. The report notes “eventually all aircraft was diverted to the Palisades,” but didn’t give  a time line. “The Helicopter Coordinator (HLCO) reached out to MFC and let them know all aircraft were being redirected to the incident in Battalion 9. HLCO also redirected the fuel tender and identified Santa Ynez Reservoir as the Palisades Helispot.”

The Sunset Fire (Hollywood) and the Pacific Palisades Fire were both using the same VHF communication channel.

“LF69 requested a different tactical channel. Subsequently, Metropolitan Fire Communication (MFC) assigned a separate tactical channel and recommended the use of a separate staging channel; however, resources checking in were confused, which caused some resources to continue to check in on T-1, some on T-2, and even some tactical communication continued on T-1”.

MFC eventually assigned T-15 for tactical communications and worked to obtain a common VHF communication plan from LA (LAC Dispatch).

Multiple communications on the divisional tactical channel were intermittent due to the terrain interference, and BC9 suggested a human repeater, if resources could not continue to communicate. However, resources continued to utilize both communication plans, causing additional confusion.

Radio and cellphone communication were not clear and continued to be a major problem during the Palisades Fire.

Due to the terrain features, repeater coverage, and shaded canyons, the VHF communications plan was inconsistent throughout the incident. Some resources turned to squirrel channels on the 800 MHz platform, but over time, this became overused and ineffective for some. There was excessive radio traffic on the initially assigned tactical frequency, leading to delayed communication, reduced situational awareness, and resources struggling to coordinate tactics and tasks.

Upon transitioning to the CAL FIRE FIMT, the interoperable communications plan created confusion as LAFD resources continued using 800 MHz frequencies.

Incident Command Post was established three times, resulting in further delays and confusion. (Station 23, Gladstones parking lot and Will Rogers Beach.)

Regarding aircraft, “BC9 requested fixed-wing aircraft due to the structures being threatened. MFC communicated to BC9 that the Super Soopers CL-14 aircraft (Quebec 1 and 2), all LAFD aircraft (rotorcraft), and all LAC aircraft were attached and enroute to the incident; however, fixed wing aircraft were not ordered.

At 10:55 “a few resources started to arrive on scene.” The location of the staging area was placed in the direct path of the evacuation route from Palisades Highlands to the north and the Marquez Knolls community to the east of Palisades Drive, which would ultimately hinder vehicles from evacuating and resources from responding to provide structure defense.

As vehicles piled up on Palisades Drive due to the resources attempting to respond to the staging location, residents were instructed by LAPD to abandon their vehicles. A log jam of vehicles prevented resources from arriving at staging or reaching their assignments for structure defense. A decision was made for a LAC bulldozer to clear the abandoned vehicles from the road, allowing firefighters to access the communities and continue with structure defense.

THE PALISADES FIRE – SECOND THIRTY MINUTES

MFC notified Palisades IC that they had Air Tactics 6 as the frequency for air attack and fixed-wing aircraft coming into the incident. At about 11:08 hours, the IC assigned 1880C to Division Alpha. The Strike Team Leader was responding with a trainee. Three LAC engine companies arrived at the staging location requested an assignment, but received no reply.

After about 20 minutes with no assignment, the companies responded to 600 Palisades Drive upon reports that fire was threatening the 75-unit Sea Ridge condominium complex, conducting fire suppression efforts, defending structures, and evacuating residents.

Multiple Palisades residents reported seeing numerous firetrucks staged in Will Roger Beach Parking lot, with firefighters, drinking coffee and hanging out. This After Action Report seems to give credence to those eyewitness reports, once again pointing to the fact firetrucks had not been assigned because of communication issues.

At about 11:25 a.m., the IC requested MFC to issue evacuation for the entire Palisades area. MFC attempted to clarify if the request was an evacuation order or a warning. By this time, the vegetation fire had transitioned from the wildland to the urban interface, structures began igniting in the Marquez Knolls, Bienveneda, Lower Marquez, and Paseo de Miramar communities.

While resources from LAFD and LAC were on the scene and engaging in structure defense efforts, the only communities protected in the first hour of the initial dispatch were Palisades Highlands, located off Chastaine Parkway and Piedra Morada Drive, Upper Marquez Knolls at Via Floresta and Floresta Place, and the Sea Ridge Condominium Complex on Palisades Drive.

THE PALISADES FIRE – THE THIRD THIRTY MINUTES

Resources remained obstructed by the continuous flow of vehicles occupying the north and south lanes of Palisades Dr., hindering their ability to support other companies engaged in structure defense. The fire posed an immediate threat to residences within the Paseo Miramar community, with long-range spotting igniting fires on the east-facing slopes of Palisades Drive.

The eastern flank had advanced into Temescal Canyon along the ridge of Temescal Canyon Trail and was burning downhill behind residences on Shadow Mountain Drive, Via Anita, and Via Cresta, merely minutes from the community of Upper El Medio. Meanwhile, the western flank had moved significantly westward into Topanga State Park toward East Topanga Fire Road in Santa Ynez Canyon.

Despite “hurricane winds” fixed-wing aircraft began to arrive on scene at this time and throughout the afternoon, including the following aircraft: US Forest Service AA52 Air-Attack: CAL Fire B-78 Lead Plane: CAL Fire T-78 S-2 Fixed Wing (Type III): CAL Fire T-88 S-2 Fixed Wing (Type III): US Forest Service T-122 (LAT): US Forest Service RJ85 (LAT): US Forest Service T01 (LAT) and US Forest Service T701 (LAT) 32.

The fixed-wing tankers and supervisors worked to deliver nearly 35,000 gallons of retardant and departed the incident at approximately 1700 hours due to their restrictions of daytime hours.

Several move-up companies were dispatched to the Palisades to cover fire station districts or respond to additional 911 calls related to the fire. However, the report writes “Metropolitan Fire Communications was unaware of the fire’s full extent.”

As more resources arrived, some companies did not attempt to recontact MFC(Metropolitan Fire Communications) and remained attached to the move-up response and others tried to contact MFC and the incident command but were unsuccessful. Some move-up companies remained unaccounted for over the course of several hours, and some were later asked to return to the City for coverage issues.

Eventually, incident commanders from both the Palisades and Sunset incidents coordinated efforts: some resources stayed to assist with Palisades, while others returned to their districts.

Resources that stayed were organized into task forces for the Palisades fire, but some of those companies lacked clear instructions and were never provided with the incident’s communication plan.

At 7:45 p.m. a decision was made to ground all aircraft.

Off-duty firefighters started reporting to work, hearing the news of the recall and filling the available positions on apparatus. The main challenge was that there were few apparatuses to fill, since most 200 series engines were already deployed to the incident, and the engine companies at the shops were mechanically unavailable and without tools or equipment.

Organization of Resources:

The organization of the incident was not clearly defined until several hours into the incident. The existing resources and overhead were unaware of the changes being implemented and were unclear about the new organizational structure and to whom they were reporting. Some overhead personnel were going around the incident organization leadership and redirecting resources that already had assignments. Accountability for specialized resources like UR88 and HR3 was left to individual company commanders, leading to informal assignments and a lack of accountability.

Ultimately, the OSC (Operations Section chief) functioned mainly as a radio operator, handling the many requests from MFC instead of actively managing the incident from a strategic and tactical level.

MFC did not adhere to the ICS-205 Communications plan and continued to contact assigned LAFD resources directly, bypassing the designated Palisades Communications. MFC does not have the capability to transmit or receive communications on VHF frequencies.

The initial communications plan for the incident did not meet the size, scope, and complexity of the incident organization that was required to effectively communicate among resources.

As the incident escalated, battalions lacked adequate coverage in the city because MFC Metropolitan Fire Communications did not request regional and state resources to backfill LAFD fire stations.

Department Operations Center was unable to obtain an accurate assessment of resource commitments to the incident. Multiple attempts to gather information from the command post resulted in conflicting data. Stations with resources assigned to the incident lacked situational awareness regarding the status of members and apparatus.

City water tenders were accessible through EMD (Emergency Management Department) and were eventually assigned to the incident. Once assigned to a division, they asked for escorts, which were not available, effectively delaying the enhancement of an additional water supply. Engineers were needed to shuttle water from further locations, further delaying suppression.

And as a slap in the face to residents, many of whom stayed and saved their home, and neighbors’ homes, they were mischaracterized in this report. Many saw no fire trucks or if they saw one, they would ask for help. They were told by firefighters, “no,” that firefighters had been told to “stand down,” meaning they were only supposed to save lives, not property.

As the report notes “Many residents chose not to evacuate and instead approached the fire companies seeking assistance for their homes. However, many of these homes were not threatened, which resulted in delays for the resources reaching the properties that were actually at risk.”